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BIANNUAL SURVEY

(a)(1) and the requirements of due process under which it
functions require New York contacts and there were no such
contacts in the case.
Activity in furtherance of contract deemed transaction
of business.
There is no set rule to determine whether the act or acts of
defendant constitute a transaction of business. Thus, the court
must judge each case in the light of its own peculiar circumstances.
The case of Iroquois Gas Corp. v. CollinsA2 was an action for
breach of contract wherein plaintiff alleged that the contract was
executed in New York and was to be performed here. Defendant,
a resident of Texas, denied the existence of a contract and moved
to dismiss on the ground that he was not subject to the court's
jurisdiction. The undisputed facts indicated that defendant was
low bidder on plaintiff's proposed pipe line crossing the Niagara
River. On two separate occasions, defendant's agents spent several
days in New York negotiating a contract to construct this pipe
line, surveying the construction site and engaging in other activities
with reference to the alleged contract. The supreme court held
that the activity in furtherance of the contract by the non-resident's
agents constituted a "transaction of business and established the
necessary minimum contacts." 48
It had been held prior to the Iroquois case that a cause of
action arising out of a contract entered into in New York constituted a transaction of business." The court in the instant case,
however, takes an even more liberal approach since it was not
definitely established whether there was in fact a contract. The
activities were sufficient in themselves, and apparently the court
found it of little consequence that the contract had not been proved.
It was enough that "defendant . . .availed himself of the privileges

of conducting business activity within the state, thus invoking the
benefit and protection of its law." 45 Sufficient basis was established
for jurisdictional purposes; if there was in fact no contract, defendant could establish that later in a hearing on the merits.
The court was influenced in this case by Kropp Forge Co. v.
Jazitz,"8 wherein the Illinois appellate court sustained in personam
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant on facts very similar to
those presented in the instant case. In Kropp, the defendant also
denied the existence of a contract but had visited plaintiff's premises
4242 Misc. 2d 632, 248 N.Y.S.2d 494 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
43 Id. at 635, 248 NY.S.2d at 497.

44Patrick Ellam, Inc. v. Nieves, supra note 38; Steele v. DeLeeuw, supra
note 38.
45 Iroquois Gas Corp. v. Collins, 42 Misc. 2d 632, 635, 248 N.Y.S.2d 494,
497 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
46 37 I1. App. 2d 475, 186 N.E.2d 76 (1962).
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in Illinois and had communicated there with plaintiff's employees.
The court held that "either the making of the alleged contract
itself, or the activity in furtherance of it, while defendant was
physically present... is the business shown to have been transacted
by defendant within Illinois. .... ,, 47 Since section 302 was modeled
on Section 17 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act, the case has direct
bearing on the former.
In an action for breach of warranty, a foreign corporation was
4
held subject to in personam jurisdiction under section 302(a) (1). 8
The defendant had contracted to sell two machines to plaintiff.
The initial agreement stipulated that the contract was made in
New York and that New York law governed the transaction. The
defendant was not doing business in New York and the machines
were delivered f.o.b. Chicago. The court, in sustaining jurisdiction,
found it unnecessary to rely on the recital that the contract was
made in New York because the pleaded cause of action (breach of
warranty) arose out of the transaction of business in New York.
Aside from extensive negotiations in New York, the participation
of defendant in the installation and testing of the machines required
officials and employees of defendant to be present here. The court
held that the constitutional requirements of due process were
satisfied "because defendant's contacts with New York were so
many and so directly physical." 49
It is important to note that in both Iroquois and Longines
the court laid great stress on the fact that the activities within
the state involved the physical presence of defendant or his agents.
Absent these physical activities, the courts might not have upheld
jurisdiction; in Hanson v. Denckla,5 0 it was stated that there must
be "some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." "' But if
the contract was made in New York, that fact in itself might be
sufficient. In the cited cases, the courts had more to rely on and
did not have to reach that question.
In personam jurisdiction in attorney's suit for fees.
The fact of defendant's officer's physical presence in New York

52
was deemed significant in Lewis v. American Archives Assn.

A written contract of employment had been executed in New
at -, 186 N.E.2d at 79.
4SLongines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 21 App.
Div. 2d 474, 251 N.Y.S.2d 740 (1st Dep't 1964).
49M. at 478, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 744.
47Id.
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U.S. 235 (1958).

Id.at 253.
5243 Misc. 2d 721, 252 N.Y.S.2d 217 (Sup. Ct. 1964).

